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Abstract 
We evaluate the effectiveness of a partial credit guarantee program implemented in a large 
Italian region using unique microdata from a broad set of firms. Our results show that the 
policy was effective to the extent that it resulted in an improved financial condition for the 
beneficiary firms. While the total amount of bank debt was unaffected, firms showed a 
significant increase in the long-term component. Furthermore, targeted firms benefited from a 
substantial decrease in interest rates. On the other hand, there is some evidence that the 
probability of default increases as a consequence of the treatment, although the effect is only 
marginally significant. There are, instead, no effects on the real outcomes. 
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1 Introduction
Guarantee schemes are widespread in both developed and developing economies,
as they are considered as an eﬀective instrument for improving access to ﬁ-
nancial assets for entrepreneurial activities. They are often funded by public
institutions, and their implementation is frequently listed among the policy
recommendations of international organizations (OECD (2011), European
Commission (2011a)). The popularity of guarantee schemes is due to the
multiplicative eﬀects embedded in such policies, their capacity to move pri-
vate capital, and the possibility of recovering a large share of the public fund
at the end of the program.
Despite their popularity, economic theory is not conclusive on the net ef-
fect of credit guarantee schemes on ﬁrms' ﬁnance. The actual eﬀects of these
programs is ultimately an empirical question, but there is very little evidence
available so far. This paper tries to ﬁll this gap, by estimating the causal
eﬀect of a credit guarantee scheme implemented in Italy in 2008. Compared
to the existing empirical literature, which is mainly based on diﬀerence-in-
diﬀerences estimators or on propensity score matching, this paper has the
advantage of relying on more advanced estimation methods, arguably re-
quiring weaker assumptions and therefore providing more ground for the
consistency of the estimated treatment eﬀects.
The identiﬁcation of the policy's net eﬀects is indeed challenging, since
treated and untreated ﬁrms may be intrinsically diﬀerent, and this diﬀerence
may be unobservable to us. Ideally, the program's eﬀectiveness is measured
by the diﬀerence in average outcome of the same group of ﬁrms with and
without treatment at the same time, respectively. Such a counterfactual sce-
nario is obviously unfeasible, but we obtain a consistent estimate of treat-
ment eﬀects via instrumental variable estimation. The exogenous source of
treatment is derived from some peculiar features of the guarantee scheme,
combined with the unforeseen acquisition of a local bank by one of the largest
Italian banking groups. The validity of the IV procedure is further reinforced
by the inclusion of a wide set of ﬁxed eﬀects and additional controls. Fur-
thermore, the estimates survive two demanding falsiﬁcation tests.
We ﬁnd that the program had no impact on the volume of ﬁrms' bank
debt, while increasing the amount of long-term debt and decreasing the in-
terest rate paid by ﬁrms. The probability of default increased slightly. All
other ﬁrm-level variables were unaﬀected; in particular, we were not able to
ﬁnd signiﬁcant eﬀects on ﬁrms' balance sheets, suggesting that the improved
ﬁnancial structure did not have a direct real eﬀect, at least in the short
term. Speciﬁcations not tackling the endogeneity of the policy fail to rec-
ognize most of these outcomes, and therefore lead to erroneous conclusions
about its eﬀects.
A further element of interest is that our analysis focuses on the credit
crunch period, when credit constraints for ﬁrms were particularly strin-
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gent. Therefore, even if the design of the policy was not explicitly targeting
ﬁnancially-constrained ﬁrms, the advent of the credit-crunch signiﬁcantly
rationed the credit supply to all eligible ﬁrms. This also leaves out some
potential endogeneity of the policy, since the crunch was surely unexpected
when the policy was designed, in the 2006.
2 SMEs lending and credit guarantees schemes
The slowing down of economic growth since the turn of the century, the
new challenges of globalisation, the fear of de-industrialisation and the re-
cent ﬁnancial crisis have renewed interest in industrial policies in Europe.
Industrial policies are often based on a mix of subsidies, which may take the
following forms: grants, deﬁned as monetary paymentstaking the form of a
lump sum, which are proportional either to the amount of the investment or
to the costs borne by the ﬁrm for a given project; tax incentives, taking ei-
ther the form of tax exemptions/reductions or that of a tax credit; subsidised
loans and public loans, mostly aimed at reducing the interest rate paid by
ﬁrms (although the incentive might also involve postponement of repayments
or a more favourable evaluation of creditworthiness); and guarantees, in the
case in which the public authority absorbs the (partial) insolvency risk of a
borrower, allowing otherwise constrained ﬁrms to access credit, and risky-
but-creditworthy ﬁrms to get ﬁnancing at a lower cost.
Furthermore, the rationale for the introduction of ﬁrm subsidies under-
lines the general consensus on both the importance of the role of SMEs in
economies and on the diﬃculties they face in accessing credit (European
Commission, 2011b). The latter depends on the higher costs of small-scale
lending, the lack of collateral, the reduced reliability of (often non audited)
ﬁnancial statements, asymmetric information, and the limited liability struc-
ture of most SMEs (Beck, Klapper and Mendoza, 2008). Credit guarantees
aim to oﬀset such situations, improving both the access to credit and the
terms of loans. On the other hand, the main argument against ﬁrm subsidies
builds on their potential distorsive eﬀects (de Meza (2002), Vogel and Adams
(1997)) and on the fact that these policies tend to replace the markets rather
than ﬁx the underlying problems causing credit restrictions for SMEs. In the
case of credit guarantees the distorsive eﬀect is considered smaller than the
other forms of aid, while the most serious critiques consist in their potential
for moral hazard, both from the ﬁrms' and from the banks' perspective, al-
though this aspect is still debated. Again, an additional advantage of credit
guarantee schemes is the low initial cost, and the fact that large losses are
incurred only in the event of multiple bankruptcies or bank failures (Beck
et al., 2008).
Broadly speaking, we can distinguish between two main typologies of
credit guarantees schemes: (1) Mutual guarantee associations (e.g., Conﬁdi
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in Italy): private societies formed by potential borrowers with limited access
to bank loans that share their debt risk. However, they suﬀer from an ad-
verse selection problem, as ﬁrms that consider joining the association know
that the schemes attract more risky ﬁrms. (2) Public guarantee schemes,
funded by regional or national authorities: run either by an administrative
government unit (e.g. development agencies, ministries, the central bank or
publicly-owned banks) or by a legally separate credit guarantee organisa-
tion. Resources usually take the form of periodic appropriations, i.e. regular
subsidies, or of a ﬁxed fund. Public guarantee schemes still represent the
majority in low-income countries, while mutual guarantees are more widely
used in high-income countries (Beck et al., 2008).
Theoretically, the eﬀect of the introduction of a credit guarantee scheme
(CGS, hereinafter) is ambiguous. In the case of ﬁrms unable to meet the
collateral requirements of the bank, a CGS can lead to more credit being
granted to the ﬁrm. Moreover, by reducing the informational asymmetries
between a ﬁrm and a bank, the presence of a guarantee can lead to lower
interest rates being paid by the borrower, hence reducing moral hazard and
adverse selection problems. Meyer and Nagarajan (1996) have argued that
credit guarantees can lead to a learning process, where banks discover that
borrowers beneﬁting from the guarantee are not as risky and unproﬁtable as
initially expected and become willing to provide loans to them in the future
without a guarantee. Riding, Madill and Haines (2007) are of a similar
view. On the other hand, a CGS might equally lead to riskier behavior
by both the entrepreneur and the bank. In particular, if the CGS enforces
entrepreneur's limited liability (i.e., if banks can only rely on a CGS), then
the ﬁrm might be willing to adopt riskier strategies than those adopted under
normal circumstances (Lelarge, Sraer and Thesmar, 2008). From a bank's
point of view, if the share of the loan covered by the guarantee is too large, the
incentive to undertake a tough screening might become smaller (Benavente,
Galetovic and Sanhueza, 2006). Another potential distortion is the fact that
banks might be induced to be too quick in writing oﬀ loans backed by the
guarantee and hence exerting little eﬀort to collect the outstanding share of
the loan.1
The empirical evidence on the eﬀectiveness of a CGS is both scarce and
mixed. Hancock, Peek and Wilcox (2007) focus on the impact of credit
guarantees provided in the US by the Small Business Administration, ﬁnding
1Vogel and Adams (1997) point at two sources of substitution that would diminish the
eﬀect of the guarantees and that would result in an overestimation of the additionality if
the analysis were carried out at the bank level. The ﬁrst one is intra-portfolio substitution:
lenders may redeﬁne the purpose of existing loans to qualify borrowers for a loan guaran-
tee, or they might employ 'column-shifting', moving distressed loans into the guaranteed
portfolio. A second one is inter-lender substitution: enterprises serviced by other banks
are captured by those banks operating under a guarantee scheme. Analysis at the ﬁrm
level, however, is less tricky.
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that the disbursement of guarantees led to an increase in both ﬁrms' output
and employment. Lelarge et al. (2008) studied the guarantee program Sofaris
(also known as Ose Garantie), carried out in France. They ﬁnd that credit
additionality holds in the intensive margin, while there are no eﬀects on
the extensive margin. In addition, the program appeared to have induced
more risk taking from the beneﬁciary ﬁrms. Kang and Heshmati (2008)
studied the impact of two CGSs implemented in Korea, focusing on ﬁrm
sales, productivity, and employment. They ﬁnd only weak evidence in favour
of credit guarantees, whose eﬀectiveness was lowered, among other things, by
the fact that they were mainly employed to support ﬁnancially unconstrained
ﬁrms. Zecchini and Ventura (2009) study the eﬀectiveness of a publicly
funded guarantee scheme for SMEs implemented in Italy. They ﬁnd that the
guarantee resulted in a greater amount of bank loans being granted to the
ﬁrms; this eﬀect, however, was rather small in size.2 The public guarantee
also lowered the costs borne by the ﬁrms. However, they noticed that the
scheme did not necessarily target the most ﬁnancially disadvantaged ﬁrms:
there was no screening to assess whether a loan proposed by a bank to the
Fund would have been granted even in the absence of a guarantee. Hence, the
pattern of guarantees could reﬂect essentially bank lending decisions, rather
than SMEs' potential needs. Columba, Gambacorta and Mistrulli (2009)
investigate the impact of the mutual guarantee institutions in Italy (Conﬁdi)
and show that small ﬁrms aﬃliated to the Conﬁdi pay lower interest rates
on loan contracts which are not backed by mutual guarantees with respect to
similar ﬁrms. Their ﬁnding is consistent with the view that mutual guarantee
instututions are better at screening and monitoring borrowers than banks
are. In a more recent paper, Mistrulli and Vacca (2011) ﬁnd that mutual
guarantee institutions played a role in avoiding a break-up in credit ﬂows
to aﬃliated ﬁrms during the crisis. Moreover, aﬃliated ﬁrms also faced
lower interest rates with respect to similar ﬁrms. On the other hand, the
deterioration in credit quality during the crisis has been more intense for
customers with guarantees from Conﬁdi.
3 The policy
In this paper we focus on a partial credit guarantee regional program devised
in 2006 in Italy to improve SMEs' access to credit. The program, which
started operating in 2008 in a large Italian region, beneﬁts from a regional
fund with an endowment of approximately ¿ 20 million per year, managed
by the regional administrative body.
2Other guarantee schemes include: Sowalﬁn (Belgium); Tempte SA (Greece); Besluit
Borgstelling Midden en Klein Bedrijf (Netherlands); Agrogarante; Garval; Lisgarante;
MCGF; Norgarante (Portugal); ISBA; SGR; Sociedad de Garantia Reciproca; Transa-
val S.G.R; (Spain); ALMI Foretagspartner AB (Sweden); and CSC Centrale Suisse de
Cautionnement (Switzerland).
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Each ﬁrm loan involves an agreement between the region and a private
covenant bank. Before conceding the loan, both the region and the covenant
bank proceed separately to a credit screening. Loans backed by the guarantee
typically have a 5 years amortization schedule, which follows a grace period
of variable length. The protection individually oﬀered by the region on each
loan covers up to 80 per cent of the losses in case of default of the ﬁrm
or write-oﬀ of the loan; these occurrences are referred as a 'credit event'.
Importantly, only a few bank groups act as covenant banks. While subsidised
loans are not formally restricted to ﬁrms lent by covenant banks, these ﬁrms
had a ﬁrst-mover and information advantage which signiﬁcantly increased
their probability of enrolling in the program.
So far, the program has consisted of several waves: we focus on the
ﬁrst one, which began in 2008, since it leaves us with a suﬃciently long
post-intervention window.3 The ﬁrst wave saw the participation of just one
covenant bank.
Eligible ﬁrms include all SMEs headquartered in the region undertaking
the policy, with a total turnover of between ¿ 1 million and ¿ 43 million in
2007, or of under ¿ 50 million and less than 250 employees (the upper bound
is set by the deﬁnition of SME given by the European Commission in the
EU Recommendation 2003/361). The turnover's lower bound, however, is
¿ 500,000 for the ﬁrms belonging to a set of sectors considered 'prioritary'.
Beneﬁciary ﬁrms must also be eligible for the application of the National
Fund by Law 662/96 (i.e., SMEs according to the deﬁnition in European
Commission Recommendation 2003/361, which are not in economic or ﬁ-
nancial distress, belonging to any sector but those considered sensitive,
such as agriculture, transport, shipbuilding, motor vehicles, and so on).
3.1 Aims of the policy and expected outputs
The eﬀectiveness of the partial credit guarantee scheme can be assessed from
various viewpoints. First, did this measure lead to an increase in the amount
of credit granted to the beneﬁciary ﬁrms? To the extent that ﬁnancially
constrained ﬁrms could obtain guarantees at a cost lower than the market
one, they could obtain more credit. Second, did the CGS result in lower
interest rates? Third, did the CGS improve the ﬁnancial structure of the
beneﬁciary ﬁrms? Even if there is no credit additionality, replacing short-
term debt with long-term debt can improve the ﬁrm's ﬁnancial structure,
eventually lowering their probability of default. Fourth, did the CGS lead to
an increase in the level of output, investments and employment? These are
indirect eﬀects in ﬁrm performance which could originate from any of the
direct mechanisms listed above, namely a larger amount of credit or a less
onerous debt structure.
3Firms treated in following waves of the program are excluded from the sample.
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Although the actual beneﬁciaries of the program are both banks and
ﬁrms, in this paper we focus mainly on ﬁrms, since they were the target of
the policy maker, and we have a clear a-priori idea of the expected outcome.
4 Data
Our empirical exercises beneﬁt from a unique and very rich database, a panel
of about 9,000 ﬁrms located in the region where the policy was implemented
and in the three neighbouring regions, which we use to further populate the
control group. The dataset is built from three diﬀerent sources and covers
the period 2003-2010
We use the oﬃcial dataset maintained by the regional administrative
body, including the full list of beneﬁciary ﬁrms. For each ﬁrm the dataset
reports a broad set of information, such as: the date of the guarantee ap-
proval, the name of the covenant bank, the amount of guaranteed loans and
that of the guarantee, the date of the ﬁrst disbursement, the riskiness (in the
application year) of the ﬁrm and several balance sheet variables referring to
the year preceding the ﬁrst disbursement.
The guarantee scheme that we focus on involved about 200 ﬁrms. We
merge this dataset with two additional sources of information: the Central
Credit Register (CCR) maintained at the Bank of Italy and the Cerved
dataset on Italian corporations.
The CCR4 provides bank-ﬁrm level information on a large set of ﬁnan-
cial variables. We are interested, in particular, in the amount of credit from
banks, the interest rate and the probability of default. Since our identi-
ﬁcation strategy relies on bank-ﬁrm relationship characteristics, we collect
end-of-year data on loans at the bank-ﬁrm level.
We also gather ﬁrm balance-sheet information from the Cerved archive,
containing data on all Italian corporations, covering the period 2003-2010.
We use this information both to improve our identiﬁcation strategy and to
investigate the impact of the guarantee scheme on real outcomes. All the
variables are measured at the end of the year.
We focus on seven dependent variables, in order to assess both the direct
and indirect eﬀects of the policy:
 Long-term bank debt: total stock of long-term loans owned by the ﬁrm
(irrespectively on the lending bank), expressed in log.
 Total bank debt: total stock of bank loans, including both short-term
loans and long-term loans, expressed in log.
4According to the Italian Banking Regulation 'for each borrower, ﬁnancial intermedi-
aries supervised by the Bank of Italy have to report to the CCR, on a monthly basis, the
amount of each loan, either granted or disbursed by banks, for all loans exceeding a given
threshold' (the threshold was ¿75,000 until 31 December 2008).
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 Share of long-term debt over total debt.
 Interest rate: nominal interest rate paid by the ﬁrm on medium and
long-term bank loans.
 Probability of default: we consider bad loans from all the outstanding
bank credit to borrowers considered insolvent. The variable is binary
and is equal to one whenever at least one lending relationship involving
the given ﬁrm is listed as 'bad' by the bank.
 Trade debts: debts towards suppliers providing goods and services
necessary to the production cycle and tangible-intangible assets. All
variables are measured at the end of the year.
 Investments: yearly growth rate of ﬁxed assets.
In order to estimate our model we introduce ﬁrm ﬁxed eﬀects. To control
for time-variant ﬁrm characteristics we include a set of lagged variables,
aimed at controlling for ﬁrm riskiness (by means of dummies based on the
z-score, which increase with the probability that a ﬁrm becomes insolvent),
the positioning of the ﬁrm in the credit market (by means of the number of
lending banks), ﬁrm age, and ﬁrm performance (measured by turnover and
total assets).
To limit selection, we restricted the sample to ﬁrms that did not enter
or exit in the period 2005-2010.5 Table 1 reports the descriptive statistics of
the ﬁrms in the sample.
5 Empirical strategy and identiﬁcation
The aim of the paper is to assess the impact of the credit guarantee scheme
on a number of ﬁrm-level variables. Formally, we estimate the treatment
eﬀect with the following regression model:
yitmr = α+ βTit +Xitγ + δi + µmt + ρrt + it (1)
where y is the potential output of interest, T is a treatment dummy, X
is a set of ﬁrm-speciﬁc time-variant controls, and δ, µ, and ρ are ﬁrm, year,
bank and region ﬁxed eﬀects, respectively; i indexes ﬁrms, t years, m lending
banks, and r regions. Bank and region ﬁxed eﬀects are allowed to change
over time. The model is estimated based on yearly data from 2005 to 2010.
If treatment were randomly assigned conditional on observables, the pa-
rameter β would be the consistent estimate of the average treatment eﬀect
(ATE). However, the treatment dummy is likely to be correlated with the
5The closed sample also allows us to evaluate the persistence of the treatment eﬀects
over time and to minimize the selection bias due to spurious exits and entries, which may
aﬀect our database.
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error term, since ﬁrms are heterogeneous and some of their unobserved id-
iosyncratic characteristics may be correlated with both the outcome variable
and the treatment dummy. This means that treated and untreated ﬁrms
are systematically diﬀerent, irrespective of the policy. We control for time-
invariant heterogeneity by means of individual ﬁxed eﬀects; however, to the
extent that unobserved idiosyncratic factors are time-variant, our estimates
are hardly consistent.
In particular, there are two main challenges to a consistent estimation
of the treatment eﬀect. First, the covenant bank may have been selected by
local policy makers because of its special attitude towards local SMEs, or be-
cause of speciﬁc trends (e.g., shrinking employment) in its portfolio of funded
ﬁrms; in turn, these factors may aﬀect the program outcome. Second, ﬁrms
selected by the bank - or self-selected - into the program may be intrinsically
diﬀerent from the average ﬁrm, e.g., they can be more credit-constrained.
This is also likely to have an independent impact on the outcome variables.
We overcome these two challenges and reach identiﬁcation by exploiting
an exogenous event that involving the bank selected to operate the policy
and a peculiar aspect of the Italian credit market.
The ﬁrst key factor in our identiﬁcation strategy is a M&A operation
aﬀecting the covenant bank. The ﬁrst wave of the guarantee scheme was
planned in 2006 and involved only one covenant bank, namely a regional
bank - which we will henceforth call 'bank A' - with a large share of loans
in the region and limited penetration outside the regional boundaries. A
few months before the program was actually implemented, at the beginning
of 2008, bank A was acquired by one of the leading Italian (and European)
banking groups previously completely unrelated to bank A, which we call
'bank B'.
Therefore, while it is likely that the original choice of the covenant bank
A when the policy had been designed could be dependent on unobservable
bank characteristics, bank B became a covenant bank only because of the
M&A operation, which was unexpected by regional policy makers. This rules
out the possibility of a bias originating from a non-random selection of the
covenant bank.
This alone, however, does not completely exclude the treatment and con-
trol groups being systematically diﬀerent, either because treated ﬁrms are
a speciﬁc selection of all ﬁrms funded by bank B, or because highly "mo-
tivated" ﬁrms may decide to change funding bank in order to enroll in the
program, or because the policy maker was targeting bank A's portfolio of
ﬁrms, rather than bank A itself.
Related to this concern, one characteristic of the Italian ﬁnancial market
contributing to our identiﬁcation strategy is the stickiness of the ﬁrm-bank
relationships. Italian ﬁrms tend to swap bank rarely, mainly because of
high switching costs (Barone, Felici and Pagnini, 2011) and the importance
of reputation for obtaining new credit. It follows that ﬁrms which were
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ﬁnanced by bank B before the policy was planned were highly likely to still
be customer of bank B when the policy had been implemented. As shown
in the next section, at ﬁrm level the lagged creditor bank is a very good
predictor of the current creditor bank.
The interactions of these two elements (the M&A event and the stickiness
of ﬁrm-bank relationships) provide a powerful source of exogenous treatment:
ﬁrms that were funded by bank B were more likely to enroll in the program for
reasons which are independent of the policy and unforeseen by the regional
policy maker. Intuitively, the group of ﬁrms funded by bank B before the
policy was planned became "randomly" very likely to enroll in the program.
We therefore build an instrumental variable based on these conditions.
More precisely, the assumption we make to validate the exclusion restric-
tion of our empirical strategy is that, conditional on ﬁrm characteristics and
on ﬁrm, time, time-bank, and time-region ﬁxed eﬀects, the treatment out-
come is independent of the ﬁrm being a customer of bank B before the policy
was planned. In the next section of the paper, we will further support the
validity of this assumption with a battery of falsiﬁcation tests.
We thus estimate an exogenous treatment propensity for ﬁrms based on a
dummy which is equal to one if the ﬁrm was lent by bank B before the PCG
scheme had been designed, expecting that ﬁrms lent by bank B in year T-n
have a higher propensity of being lent by bank B in year T, and therefore of
belonging to the treatment group.
Furthermore, bank B, being one of the major Italian and European bank-
ing group, holds a large number of lending contracts in neighbouring regions,
which allows to control for a time-variant bank ﬁxed eﬀect; this is a partic-
ularly powerful control, since Italian banks show little variability in their
lending strategy across geographical areas (Bank of Italy, 2011).
In theory, we could simply use a dummy equal to one if the ﬁrm is
lent by bank B at time T-n as an instrument. However, given that the
endogenous variable is binary, we opt for the procedure 18.1 suggested by
(Wooldridge, 2002)6, which has been proven to produce consistent estimators
and asymptotically valid standard errors and test statistics, while increasing
eﬃciency. The exogenous treatment propensity is thus estimated in the
following way:
Pr (T iT ) = α+ φ1BankBt−3 + Eligibleit−3φ2 +Xi0φ3 + εiT (2)
where the probability of treatment in the year T in which the program
was implemented (2008) is a function of having a lending relationship with
bank B three years earlier (i.e. in 2005, before the program was designed or
announced) but no lending relationship with the covenant bank A, of being
eligible three years earlier (in 2005, the year before the policy was announced;
6See, in particular, section 6.1.1 and 18.4.1
10
the variable is a binary dummy), and on a set of ﬁrm-speciﬁc variables at
time 0, i.e., the year in which the ﬁrm entered the sample (2004 or 2005).
The model is estimated with a Probit regression only for the treatment year
T.
The estimated propensity score subsequently becomes the instrumental
variable in a two-stages least square estimation of model 1.
We also perform a robustness test using the simpler binary instrument
(equal to one if the ﬁrm had a lending relationship with bank B three years
earlier, and if eligibility conditions were met the year before treatment).
As expected, this second set of results are similar to the ones based on
the exogenous treatment propensity, but less precise. The results are not
reported here for the sake of brevity, but they are available from the author
upon request.
By conditioning on bank-ﬁrm relationships at T-3 (year 2005), our em-
pirical strategy implicitly evaluates the eﬀect of the policy on ﬁrm credit
in terms of the intensive margin only. In this paper we do not attempt to
investigate the eﬀect in terms of the extensive margin since the policy, by
conditioning the application to the ﬁrms having reached a turnout greater
than ¿ 1 million in 2007, de facto implicitly targets incumbent ﬁrms7.
6 Results
We ﬁnd that the policy was eﬀective to the extent that it resulted in an
improved ﬁnancial conditions for the beneﬁciary ﬁrms. While those results
conﬁrm that the total amount of bank debt was unaﬀected, treated ﬁrms
showed a signiﬁcant increase in the long-term component. Moreover, tar-
geted ﬁrms beneﬁted from a substantial decrease in interest rates. On the
other hand, the program slightly aﬀected the risk of moral hazard: the prob-
ability of default for a treated ﬁrm becomes larger than that of an otherwise
identical untreated company in the two years following the treatment, while
the impact is negligible if a longer period is considered. Finally, we observe
only weak eﬀects on the real outcomes: the policy had no signiﬁcant impact
on investments and trade debts.
We present these results in detail below, commenting on both OLS and
IVE results. In every column reporting IVE results, the last row shows the
Kleibergen-Paap Wald F-statistic of the corresponding ﬁrst stage regression,
which is always well above the weak instrument threshold calculated by
Stock and Yogo (2005). The tables report the coeﬃcient values; given that
all variables are expressed in log, the coeﬃcients correspond to elasticities.
 Long-term bank debt (table 2): the policy targeted long-term loans
7This is conﬁrmed by our data: about 90 per cent of treated ﬁrms were already regis-
tered in the Credit Register in 2005. Hence, the impact of the policy at study in terms of
the extensive margin appears barely relevant.
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directly , and indeed we ﬁnd a positive eﬀect. OLS estimates show
that these increased by 36% on average in the ﬁrst year, 33% over two
years, and 30% over three years. The results for IVE coeﬃcients are
very similar: when the selection is controlled for, the eﬀect is equal to
40% in the ﬁrst year, 23% over two years, and 21% over three years.
 Total bank debt (table 3): OLS estimates suggest that the policy in-
creased the volume of total bank debt too, since coeﬃcients are signif-
icantly positive, and range from 17% (in the ﬁrst year) to 12% (over
three years). However, IVE coeﬃcients are much smaller and not stat-
ically diﬀerent from zero. In particular, the coeﬃcient over three years
is equal to -0.13 with a standard error of 0.09. Therefore, once we
control for endogenous selection in the treatment sample, substitution
across time and type of debts cancels out the positive impact of the
program on the volume of loans.
 The share of long-term bank debt over total bank debt (table 4): both
OLS and IV estimates suggest that, in accordance with previous re-
sults, the share of long-term debt over total bank debt increases, sug-
gesting that ﬁrms move towards a more balanced (and less costly)
ﬁnancing structure.
 Interest rates (table 5): since we consider the average interest rate paid
by the ﬁrms on all operations, hence adjusting very slowly, we allow
for one extra year before starting to assess the impact of the policy.
Contrary to loans, the eﬀect on interest rates is increasing over time,
as it ranges from 45 base points over two years to 53 base points over
three years. IVE estimates are somewhat bigger than OLS in absolute
value.
 Probability of default (table 6): we assess the policy's impact on the
probability of default by estimating a linear probability model. OLS
estimates do not show any signiﬁcant eﬀect on the probability of loans
turning 'bad'; when we estimate our model through IVE, the coeﬃcient
becomes marginally signiﬁcant over the ﬁrst two years. Trade debts
(table 7): OLS results suggest that the public guarantee did not lead
to a reduction in trade debts; this is conﬁrmed by IVE.
 Investments (table 8): The OLS estimates indicate a positive eﬀect of
the policy on ﬁrm investments, which is signiﬁcant in the ﬁrst year only,
suggesting intertemporal substitution (Bronzini and de Blasio, 2006).
When we estimate our model through IVE, the coeﬃcient is larger
and still signiﬁcant for the ﬁrst year; when we consider longer post
intervention periods we ﬁnd no signiﬁcant eﬀects8.
8This result might also be aﬀected by the optional revaluation of ﬁxed assets undertaken
by ﬁrms, according to decree law no. 185 of 29 november 2008.
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It is worth stressing, however, that the absence of eﬀects on real outcomes
should not be interpreted as conclusive: ﬁrst, balance-sheet data are notably
less precise and reliable than other sources; second, the time horizon consid-
ered (three years) might be too short, as the additional funding may produce
positive eﬀects with a longer time lag, especially for turnover.9 Third, the
policy coincided with the the outbreak of the international ﬁnancial crisis,
which resulted in a deep contraction of economic activity in Italy. This in
turn implied a general levelling-oﬀ of investments and turnover which helped
reduce diﬀerences between treated and control ﬁrms.
6.1 Heterogeneous eﬀects
Although the results are quite clear-cut, it could still be possible that the
policy outcome is substantially diﬀerent for a speciﬁc subgroup of ﬁrms.
We investigate this possibility along two diﬀerent dimensions: ﬁrm age and
ﬁrm size (as measured by yearly turnover). The traditional approach for
testing for heterogeneous eﬀects is by means of a sample split at the median.
The results (available upon request) do not show any statistically signiﬁcant
heterogeneous eﬀect. However, the lack of signiﬁcance could also be due to
a lower precision of IV estimates with smaller samples. With the available
data, we cannot therefore be conclusive as to the existence of heterogeneous
eﬀects.
7 Diﬀerence in diﬀerences method
In this section we provide some robustness and assess the impact of the policy
by means of a matching - diﬀerence in diﬀerences method. The treatment
group consists of all ﬁrms which ﬁrst beneﬁted from the guarantee in 2008
from "bank A". We exploit the fact that 70% of those ﬁrms were previously
borrowing from "bank A" to restrict our focus to this subset (95 ﬁrms),
matching it with a similar set of "untreated" ﬁrms that were also borrowing
from "bank A" before 2008. We perform a nearest neighbour matching,
exploiting ﬁrms' location, sector, pre-treatment dynamics of both long-term
debt and total debt, pre-treatment amount of borrowed funds (both long-
term and short term). In particular, we associate each "treated" ﬁrm to
three very similar "untreated" ﬁrms, ending up with a sample of 380 ﬁrms,
described in table 11.
We then estimate the following model:
yit = β0 + β1dsubsidy + β2postt + δdsubsidy · postt + i,t (3)
9We would, instead, expect a short-term eﬀect of improved ﬁnancial conditions on
investments and trade debt.
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where yi is our outcome variable, dsubsidy is a dummy indicating whether
or not the ﬁrm received the guarantee, and post is a dummy equal to 1
from 2008 onwards.
The estimates of the DID model (table 12) are in line with our previ-
ous ﬁndings. On average, the estimates show that there is no impact on
total bank debt, while ﬁrms increase the amount of long-term debt, suggest-
ing that, in the absence of treatment, ﬁrms over-rely on short term credit.
We also ﬁnd that treated ﬁrms face a statistically signiﬁcant reduction of
the cost of debt, with an estimated drop of 24 base points. On the other
hand, in accordance with previous results, there seem to be no eﬀects on real
outcomes.
8 Falsiﬁcation test
We design two diﬀerent falsiﬁcation tests to reinforce the validity of our
identiﬁcation strategy. The ﬁrst test simulates the policy in a region adjacent
to the one under analysis. We then create a placebo treatment based on
the same criteria we used to build our instrumental variable. We create a
treatment dummy which is equal to one in year 2008 if ﬁrms were funded
by the covenant bank B in 2005 and they were eligible in 2007. In all other
respects, the regressions are identical to those reported earlier. If this placebo
treatment ended up being signiﬁcant, it would mean that the way in which
we build our instrumental variables introduces a bias. If, on the contrary,
the placebo treatment proved insigniﬁcant, this would provide supporting
evidence for our exclusion restrictions. T results (see table 9) show that
this is indeed the case: the placebo treatment is never signiﬁcant, and point
estimates are generally close to zero.
The second falsiﬁcation exercise aims at testing the validity of the ex-
clusion restrictions of the 2SLS estimation. The test consists in regressing
(by OLS) the output variables on the instrumental variables and other con-
trols, while limiting the sample to the group of untreated eligible ﬁrms. The
intuition here is that, under standard exclusion restrictions, the instrument
should not have any direct eﬀect on the output variables; the only eﬀect of
the instrument on the dependent variable is indirect, and passes through the
treatment. We therefore estimate the model of equation 1 only on the group
of untreated eligible ﬁrms. Again, the results (table 10) support the validity
of the exclusion restrictions, since the instrument is never signiﬁcant across
all regressions.
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9 Limits: extensive margin, LATE, and external
validity
The recent econometric literature has pointed out that in some circumstances
IV estimates may be consistent only for some groups of observation, leading
to the estimation of a local average treatment eﬀect (LATE), rather than the
average across the full sample (ATE). Furthermore, the validity of the IV
estimation relies on the so-called monotonicity assumption on the functional
form of the ﬁrst stage equation (Imbens and Angrist, 1994). In our setting,
the treatment of LATE should be generalized to the case in which covariates
are included in the regression, and exclusion restrictions are more plausible
after conditioning on covariates. Under conventional LATE assumptions,
2SLS would produce a weighted average of covariate-speciﬁc LATEs, which
are less intuitive to treat than traditional LATE in univariate 2SLS, but
are also (more) likely to approximate the real causal relationship of interest
(Angrist and Pischke, 2008). This seems to be conﬁrmed by the fact that
our 2SLS results are reassuringly similar to those obtained via a simpler DID
estimator. This leads us to conclude that our estimates should not be very
far from the real ATE.
Another limit to the generality of our ﬁndings is their external valid-
ity, due to the geographically limited scope of the program. More generally,
external validity is often an issue in studies which mainly focus on the identi-
ﬁcation strategy (e.g., contributions in experimental economics involving one
or a few villages in a developing country). Since the program targets ﬁrms
located in just one region (although as populous as a small European coun-
try), the sample of ﬁrms involved can be quite speciﬁc, and their response to
treatment may be inﬂuenced by some local idiosyncratic ﬁrm characteristics,
being therefore diﬀerent from the potential response of ﬁrms in other regions
or countries. However, by including non-treated ﬁrms located in neighbour-
ing regions, we are able to control for some observed and unobserved regional
eﬀects. The extraordinary circumstances of the period under analysis, co-
incident with the 2008 international ﬁnancial crisis and the related credit
crunch, also need to be taken into account: it could be that in more normal
times the policy would produce diﬀerent eﬀects. On the other hand, as we
mentioned earlier, the unforeseen worsening of credit conditions for SMEs
provides interesting exogenous variation in our setting, since we can assume
that almost all eligible ﬁrms were ﬁnancially constrained when the policy
was implemented. Furthermore, unfortunately for Italy and Europe, neither
the crisis nor the credit crunch appear to be over.
Finally, it is worth mentioning that our results consider the intensive
margin only. To avoid a selection bias originating from ﬁrms entering or
exiting the sample for unknown (but perhaps non-random) reasons, we limit
the analysis to ﬁrms which we could track continuously for both the balance
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sheet and credit data from 2005 to 2010. Therefore, ﬁrms with a total bank
debt volume of less than ¿75,000 before 2005 which eventually increased
their debt volume thanks to the policy are excluded. However, the policy
itself was implicitly targeting incumbent ﬁrms, by requiring a turnover of
more than ¿1 million in 2007 - a value very diﬃcult to achieve without
having accessed banking ﬁnance previously. Our data show that 95 per cent
of the ﬁrms targeted by the policy were borrowing money from banks in
2005.
10 Conclusion
Guarantee schemes are widespread in both developed and developing economies,
where they are seen as an eﬀective instrument for improving the access to ﬁ-
nancial assets for entrepreneurial activities, especially SMEs. They are often
funded by public institutions, and their implementation is frequently listed
among the policy recommendations of international organizations. The pop-
ularity of guarantee schemes is due to the multiplicative eﬀects embedded in
these policies, their capacity to move private capital, and the possibility of
recovering a large share of the public fund at the end of the program.
Despite their prevalence, economic theory is not conclusive on the net
eﬀect of CGSs on ﬁrms ﬁnance. In this paper we evaluate the eﬀectiveness
of a partial credit guarantee policy program, using unique micro-data from
a large set of Italian ﬁrms. Using instrumental variable estimations based
on speciﬁc features of the program, we are able to identify the treatment
eﬀect of the policy on a number of potential outcome variables - such as the
total bank debt of each ﬁrm, the cost of credit, the debt structure, the ﬁrm
turnover, and the probability of default - in the two-three years following
treatment.
We ﬁnd that the program had no signiﬁcant impact on the total volume
of ﬁrms' bank debt. On the other hand, the policy led to a statistically
signiﬁcant increase in the volume of long term debt. This is an interesting
outcome, since international comparisons suggest that Italian SMEs have a
debt structure unbalanced toward the short-term component (Brandolini and
Bugamelli, 2009; Fagiolo and Luzzi, 2006). The introduction of the policy
also resulted in lower interest rates being paid by beneﬁciary ﬁrms. There
is, however, some evidence of moral hazard by ﬁrms, with the probability
of default being marginally signiﬁcant. Firm investments showed a weakly
signiﬁcant increase in the ﬁrst year only. The lack of real eﬀects, however,
might be partly due to data limitation and the short temporal horizon.
IV results are conﬁrmed by those obtained through an alternative identi-
ﬁcation strategy, involving a diﬀerence in diﬀerences estimation over a sam-
ple of homogeneous ﬁrms. Moreover, the results survive a battery of highly
demanding falsiﬁcation tests.
16
References
Angrist, J. and Pischke, J. (2008). Mostly Harmless Econometrics: An Em-
piricist's Companion, Princeton University Press, Princeton, NJ.
Bank of Italy (2011). Geographical breakdown of credit supply and demand
in 2010, Regional Economies .
Barone, G., Felici, R. and Pagnini, M. (2011). Switching costs in local credit
markets, International Journal of Industrial Organization 29(6): 694
704.
Beck, T., Klapper, L. and Mendoza, J. (2008). The typology of partial credit
guarantee funds around the world, The World Bank, Policy research
working paper n. 4771 .
Benavente, J. M., Galetovic, A. and Sanhueza, R. (2006). Fogape: an eco-
nomic analysis, mimeo .
Brandolini, A. and Bugamelli, M. (eds) (2009). Reports on trends in the
Italian productive system, Occasional paper 45-09, Bank of Italy.
Bronzini, R. and de Blasio, G. (2006). Evaluating the impact of investment
incentives: The case of Italy's law 488/92, Journal of Urban Economics
60: 327349.
Columba, F., Gambacorta, L. and Mistrulli, P. (2009). Mutual guarantee
institutions and small business ﬁnance, Discussion paper 735-09, Bank
of Italy .
de Meza, D. (2002). Overlending?, The Economic Journal 112.
European Commission (2011a). Press release, http://europa.eu .
European Commission (2011b). SMEs' access to ﬁnance, Survey 2011 .
Fagiolo, G. and Luzzi, A. (2006). Do liquidity constraints matter in explain-
ing ﬁrm size and growth? Some evidence from the Italian manufacturing
industry, Industrial and Corporate Change, 2006 .
Hancock, D., Peek, J. and Wilcox, J. (2007). The repercussions on small
banks and small business of bank capital and loan guarantees, Working
paper 07-22, Wharton University .
Imbens, G. W. and Angrist, J. D. (1994). Identiﬁcation and estimation of
local average treatment eﬀects, Econometrica 62 (2): 467475.
Kang, J. W. and Heshmati, A. (2008). Eﬀect of credit guarantee policy on
survival and performance of SMEs in Republic of Korea, Small Business
Economics 31.
17
Lelarge, C., Sraer, D. and Thesmar, D. (2008). Entrepreneurship and credit
constraints. evidence from a French loan guarantee program, mimeo .
Meyer, R. L. and Nagarajan, G. (1996). Evaluating credit guarantee pro-
grams in developing countries, mimeo .
Mistrulli, P. and Vacca, V. (eds) (2011). Mutual guarantee institutions and
small business credit during the crisis, Occasional paper 105, Bank of
Italy.
OECD (2011). The impact of the global crisis on SME and entrepreneurship
ﬁnancing and policy responses, Contribution to the OECD Strategic
Response to the Financial and Economic Crisis .
Riding, A., Madill, J. and Haines, G. (2007). Incrementality of SME loan
guarantees, Small Business Economics 29.
Stock, J. and Yogo, M. (2005). Testing for Weak Instruments in Linear
IV Regression, in D.W.K. Andrews and J.H. Stock (eds.), Identiﬁca-
tion and Inference for Econometric Models, Essays in Honor of Thomas
Rothenberg, Cambridge University Press, New York, pp. 80108.
Vogel, R. and Adams, D. (1997). Costs and beneﬁts of loan guarantee pro-
grams, The Financier - Analyses of Capital and Money Market Trans-
actions 4.
Wooldridge, J. (2002). Econometric Analysis of Cross Section and Panel
Data, MIT Press, Cambridge, Mass.
Zecchini, S. and Ventura, M. (2009). The impact of public guarantees on
credit to SMEs, Small Business Economics 32.
18
Tables
Table 1: Sample descriptive statistics
Stat. Total debt Long-term debt
Prob of Interest
Riskiness Sales
default rate
Untreated
mean 3005270 1856670 0.0 4.5 5.2 6972.3
median 1336384 725456 0.0 4.6 5.0 3429.5
sd 5188754 4020140 0.1 1.4 1.8 9035.4
n 6071 6071 6071 5220 6060 6071
Treated
mean 4705120 2378448 0.0 4.6 5.5 11950.4
median 3377808 1333069 0.0 4.8 6.0 9014.5
sd 4294053 2730099 0.1 1.4 1.4 10106.7
n 152 152 152 148 152 152
Stat.
Total Tang. Trade
Leverage
No. of Year of
assets assets debt banks estab.
Untreated
mean 7605.4 2096.2 1695.9 0.7 5.0 1986
median 3706.0 580.0 730.0 0.7 4.0 1988
sd 12332.5 6066.1 2704.4 1.7 3.4 13
n 6071 6071 6071 6071 6071 6071
Treated
mean 11373.3 2151.6 3298.8 0.7 6.7 1983
median 8231.0 887.0 2395.0 0.8 6.0 1985
sd 9573.9 3221.4 3123.4 0.2 3.9 14
n 152 152 152 152 152 152
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Table 2: Long-term bank debt
OLS IV OLS IV OLS IV
Dep. variable Long-term bank debt
Treated 1 year 0.363*** 0.403**
(0.052) (0.158)
Treated 2 years 0.328*** 0.229*
(0.053) (0.130)
Treated 3 years 0.295*** 0.212
(0.056) (0.131)
Turnover (t-1) 0.022 0.022 0.080*** 0.080*** 0.072*** 0.072***
(0.038) (0.038) (0.030) (0.028) (0.024) (0.021)
Total assets (t-1) 0.378*** 0.378*** 0.359*** 0.360*** 0.423*** 0.423***
(0.047) (0.048) (0.030) (0.029) (0.028) (0.024)
Low riskiness (t-1) 0.021 0.021 -0.075** -0.076*** -0.082*** -0.083***
(0.036) (0.035) (0.030) (0.027) (0.026) (0.023)
Medium riskiness (t-1) -0.018 -0.018 -0.039*** -0.039*** -0.041*** -0.042***
(0.018) (0.017) (0.014) (0.014) (0.013) (0.012)
No. of banks (t-1) 0.088*** 0.088*** 0.143*** 0.143*** 0.162*** 0.162***
(0.025) (0.025) (0.022) (0.020) (0.019) (0.018)
Firm age 0.115 0.114 0.211 0.212 0.411** 0.413**
(0.182) (0.171) (0.163) (0.152) (0.190) (0.176)
Observations 12633 12633 16805 16805 20923 20923
R-square (within) 0.058 0.034 0.065 0.046 0.078 0.060
Number of ﬁrms 4280 4280 4280 4280 4280 4280
F-stat excl. instr. 94.12 207.2 234.9
Robust standard errors in parentheses.
*** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1.
All regressions include Region*Year and Bank*Year ﬁxed eﬀects.
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Table 3: Total bank debt
OLS IV OLS IV OLS IV
Dep. variable Total bank debt
Treated 1 year 0.166*** -0.048
(0.034) (0.108)
Treated 2 years 0.140*** -0.105
(0.036) (0.090)
Treated 3 years 0.122*** -0.126
(0.037) (0.088)
Turnover (t-1) 0.037 0.036 0.101*** 0.101*** 0.124*** 0.123***
(0.029) (0.028) (0.025) (0.022) (0.020) (0.017)
Total assets (t-1) 0.296*** 0.298*** 0.291*** 0.292*** 0.353*** 0.354***
(0.034) (0.034) (0.022) (0.021) (0.021) (0.018)
Low riskiness (t-1) 0.012 0.011 -0.088*** -0.091*** -0.115*** -0.118***
(0.025) (0.025) (0.021) (0.020) (0.018) (0.017)
Medium riskiness (t-1) -0.022** -0.023** -0.047*** -0.047*** -0.054*** -0.055***
(0.011) (0.011) (0.009) (0.009) (0.009) (0.008)
No. of banks (t-1) 0.102*** 0.103*** 0.154*** 0.155*** 0.179*** 0.180***
(0.020) (0.019) (0.017) (0.016) (0.015) (0.014)
Firm age -0.042 -0.037 0.057 0.060 0.124* 0.130**
(0.091) (0.090) (0.084) (0.084) (0.065) (0.060)
Observations 12633 12633 16805 16805 20923 20923
R-square (within) 0.120 0.039 0.132 0.066 0.156 0.097
Number of ﬁrms 4280 4280 4280 4280 4280 4280
F-stat excl. instr. 94.12 207.2 234.9
Robust standard errors in parentheses.
*** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1.
All regressions include Region*Year and Bank*Year ﬁxed eﬀects.
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Table 4: Share of long-term bank debt over total bank debt
OLS IV OLS IV OLS IV
Dep. variable Share of long-term bank debt over total bank debt
Treated 1 year 0.198*** 0.451***
(0.040) (0.139)
Treated 2 years 0.188*** 0.334***
(0.040) (0.108)
Treated 3 years 0.174*** 0.338***
(0.042) (0.105)
Turnover (t-1) -0.014 -0.014 -0.021 -0.021 -0.051*** -0.051***
(0.025) (0.025) (0.020) (0.018) (0.017) (0.015)
Total assets (t-1) 0.082*** 0.080*** 0.069*** 0.068*** 0.070*** 0.069***
(0.025) (0.026) (0.017) (0.017) (0.016) (0.014)
Low riskiness (t-1) 0.009 0.009 0.013 0.014 0.033* 0.035**
(0.024) (0.023) (0.019) (0.018) (0.017) (0.016)
Medium riskiness (t-1) 0.004 0.005 0.008 0.008 0.013 0.014
(0.013) (0.012) (0.010) (0.010) (0.009) (0.009)
No. of banks (t-1) -0.014 -0.015 -0.011 -0.012 -0.018 -0.018
(0.017) (0.017) (0.014) (0.013) (0.012) (0.011)
Firm age 0.157 0.152 0.154 0.152 0.287* 0.283**
(0.113) (0.109) (0.104) (0.102) (0.153) (0.143)
Observations 12633 12633 16805 16805 20923 20923
R-square (within) 0.029 -0.001 0.025 0.003 0.025 0.003
Number of ﬁrms 4280 4280 4280 4280 4280 4280
F-stat excl. instr. 94.12 207.2 234.9
Robust standard errors in parentheses.
*** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1.
All regressions include Region*Year and Bank*Year ﬁxed eﬀects.
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Table 5: Interest rate
OLS IV OLS IV
Dep. variable Interest rate
Treated 2 years -0.453*** -0.866**
(0.077) (0.350)
Treated 3 years -0.526*** -1.264***
(0.081) (0.349)
Turnover (t-1) -0.107* -0.108* -0.049 -0.050
(0.060) (0.059) (0.055) (0.046)
Total assets (t-1) -0.096 -0.092 -0.157** -0.151***
(0.067) (0.064) (0.067) (0.048)
Low riskiness (t-1) -0.131** -0.135** -0.205*** -0.214***
(0.064) (0.061) (0.060) (0.053)
Medium riskiness (t-1) -0.076** -0.078*** -0.120*** -0.125***
(0.031) (0.030) (0.030) (0.027)
No. of banks (t-1) -0.043 -0.044 -0.081* -0.081**
(0.045) (0.046) (0.043) (0.039)
Firm age 0.072 0.078 0.161 0.169
(0.109) (0.206) (0.128) (0.180)
Observations 7215 7215 8793 8793
R-square (within) 0.733 0.005 0.742 0.004
Number of ﬁrms 2125 2125 2125 2125
F-stat excl. instr. 65.61 73.27
Robust standard errors in parentheses.
*** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1.
All regressions include Region*Year and Bank*Year ﬁxed eﬀects.
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Table 6: Probability of default
OLS IV OLS IV OLS IV
Dep. variable Probability of default
Treated 1 year 0.009 0.025*
(0.008) (0.015)
Treated 2 years 0.008 0.025*
(0.006) (0.014)
Treated 3 years 0.006 0.022
(0.006) (0.014)
Turnover (t-1) -0.003 -0.003 -0.003 -0.003 -0.012*** -0.012***
(0.003) (0.003) (0.002) (0.002) (0.004) (0.004)
Total assets (t-1) 0.000 0.000 -0.000 -0.000 -0.002 -0.002
(0.003) (0.003) (0.002) (0.002) (0.003) (0.003)
Low riskiness (t-1) -0.001 -0.001 -0.004** -0.004** -0.010*** -0.010***
(0.002) (0.002) (0.002) (0.002) (0.002) (0.002)
Medium riskiness (t-1) -0.000 -0.000 -0.004** -0.004** -0.009*** -0.008***
(0.002) (0.002) (0.002) (0.002) (0.002) (0.002)
No. of banks (t-1) -0.002 -0.002 -0.002 -0.002 -0.005** -0.005**
(0.002) (0.002) (0.001) (0.002) (0.002) (0.002)
Firm age -0.033 -0.034 -0.020 -0.020 -0.015 -0.015
(0.036) (0.042) (0.022) (0.027) (0.016) (0.017)
Observations 12633 12633 16805 16805 20923 20923
R-square (within) 0.005 -0.000 0.006 0.000 0.019 0.005
Number of ﬁrms 4280 4280 4280 4280 4280 4280
F-stat excl. instr. 94.12 207.2 234.9
Robust standard errors in parentheses.
*** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1.
All regressions include Region*Year and Bank*Year ﬁxed eﬀects.
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Table 7: Trade debts
OLS IV OLS IV OLS IV
Dep. variable Trade debts
Treated 1 year 0.040 0.049
(0.047) (0.119)
Treated 2 years 0.038 -0.040
(0.050) (0.115)
Treated 3 years 0.028 0.024
(0.053) (0.135)
Low riskiness (t-1) -0.030 -0.030 0.011 0.011 0.179* 0.179*
(0.072) (0.085) (0.063) (0.078) (0.097) (0.100)
Medium riskiness (t-1) 0.001 0.001 -0.033 -0.034* -0.108*** -0.108***
(0.025) (0.025) (0.020) (0.020) (0.027) (0.026)
No. of banks (t-1) -0.016 -0.016 -0.013 -0.013 -0.008 -0.008
(0.014) (0.014) (0.012) (0.011) (0.013) (0.013)
Firm age 0.037* 0.037* 0.075*** 0.075*** -0.005 -0.005
(0.020) (0.020) (0.017) (0.016) (0.021) (0.020)
Observations 11280 11280 14886 14886 17948 17948
R-square (within) 0.009 0.001 0.031 0.003 0.064 0.002
Number of ﬁrms 3963 3963 3963 3963 3963 3963
F-stat excl. instr. 76.03 152.6 172.5
Robust standard errors in parentheses.
*** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1.
All regressions include Region*Year and Bank*Year ﬁxed eﬀects.
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Table 8: Investments
OLS IV OLS IV OLS IV
Dep. variable Firm investments
Treated 1 year 0.081** 0.220*
(0.036) (0.128)
Treated 2 years 0.034 0.121
(0.027) (0.093)
Treated 3 years 0.032 0.114
(0.023) (0.083)
Low riskiness (t-1) 0.038* 0.039** 0.009 0.010 0.011 0.012
(0.019) (0.020) (0.014) (0.015) (0.012) (0.012)
Medium riskiness (t-1) 0.014 0.015 0.000 0.001 -0.000 0.000
(0.010) (0.010) (0.008) (0.008) (0.006) (0.006)
No. of banks (t-1) -0.015 -0.016 -0.019** -0.020** -0.009 -0.010
(0.014) (0.014) (0.010) (0.010) (0.008) (0.008)
Firm age 0.067 0.063 0.020 0.018 -0.002 -0.005
(0.066) (0.076) (0.061) (0.068) (0.060) (0.058)
Observations 11062 11062 14221 14221 17306 17306
R-square (within) 0.060 -0.001 0.082 -0.001 0.076 -0.001
Number of ﬁrms 4139 4139 4139 4139 4139 4139
F-stat excl. instr. 46.46 88.18 97.16
Robust standard errors in parentheses.
*** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1.
All regressions include Region*Year and Bank*Year ﬁxed eﬀects.
26
Table 9: Falsiﬁcation test 1: other region
Dep. variable
Long-term Total Share Interest Prob of Invest- Trade
debt debt rate default ments debts
Treated 0.027 -0.014 0.005 -0.089 -0.036 -0.016
(0.041) (0.029) (0.021) (0.055) (0.036) (0.035)
Observations 6289 6289 6289 5085 5571 5754
R-square (within) 0.044 0.110 0.045 0.751 0.098 0.016
Treated 2 years 0.046 -0.013 0.005 -0.079 -0.000 -0.030 0.008
(0.041) (0.028) (0.019) (0.062) (0.004) (0.026) (0.035)
Observations 8365 8365 8365 6597 8483 7135 7604
R-square (within) 0.057 0.126 0.040 0.807 0.017 0.126 0.055
Treated 3 years 0.064 -0.012 0.017 -0.082 0.004 -0.024 -0.004
(0.042) (0.029) (0.019) (0.066) (0.006) (0.023) (0.040)
Observations 10421 10421 10421 8114 10597 8683 9222
R-square (within) 0.072 0.151 0.038 0.813 0.034 0.114 0.082
Robust standard errors in parentheses.
*** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1.
All regressions include Region*Year and Bank*Year ﬁxed eﬀects.
All regressions include the corresponding set of controls reported in tables 2-7.
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Table 10: Falsiﬁcation test 2: untreated eligible ﬁrms
Dep. variable
Long-term Total Share Interest Prob of Invest- Trade
debt debt rate default ments debts
IV 1 year 0.091 -0.107 0.198 0.017 0.070 0.036
(0.207) (0.126) (0.168) (0.014) (0.129) (0.164)
Observations 12232 12232 12232 12232 10714 10945
R-square (within) 0.050 0.114 0.028 0.005 0.059 0.010
IV 2 year -0.109 -0.175 0.065 -0.230 0.015 0.015 -0.118
(0.213) (0.136) (0.173) (0.340) (0.011) (0.083) (0.172)
Observations 16300 16300 16300 7293 16300 14449 14567
R-square (within) 0.060 0.128 0.024 0.730 0.006 0.075 0.031
IV 3 year -0.060 -0.167 0.107 -0.408 0.011 0.044 -0.031
(0.222) (0.138) (0.176) (0.406) (0.014) (0.071) (0.171)
Observations 20328 20328 20328 9168 20328 18122 17692
R-square (within) 0.075 0.155 0.025 0.736 0.019 0.069 0.064
Robust standard errors in parentheses.
*** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1.
All regressions include Region*Year and Bank*Year ﬁxed eﬀects.
All regressions include the corresponding set of controls reported in tables 2-7.
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Table 11: DID sample
2007 Obs. Mean Std. Dev. Min. Max.
Untreated
Long-term debt 285 15.2 0.9 11.5 16.8
Short-term debt 285 14.4 1.1 11.0 16.5
Interest rate 239 6.0 0.5 4.0 6.9
Turnover 285 9.2 0.9 5.7 10.8
Capital 285 6.6 1.6 0.0 10.0
Treated
Long-term debt 95 15.2 0.9 11.9 16.6
Short-term debt 95 14.3 1.2 10.7 16.1
Interest rate 81 6.0 0.6 2.7 6.9
Turnover 95 9.2 0.9 6.8 10.8
Capital 94 6.6 1.6 1.9 9.8
Note: all variables excluding interest rate are reported in logs.
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Table 12: matching-DID estimates
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6)
Dep. variable Tot. debt Short t. debt Int. rate Prob of default Turnover Tot. assets
Treated 0.072 -0.049 0.018 -0.001 0.124 -0.089
(0.104) (0.142) (0.076) (0.003) (0.105) (0.205)
Post 0.067** -0.039 -1.273*** 0.010* -0.054** 0.314***
(0.033) (0.055) (0.079) (0.006) (0.024) (0.076)
Treated*post 0.080 0.291*** -0.240** 0.012 0.006 0.154
(0.057) (0.086) (0.111) (0.012) (0.045) (0.113)
Observations 1894 1894 1651 1894 1518 1511
R2 0.123 0.114 0.215 0.038 0.200 0.198
Robust standard errors in parentheses.
*** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1.
All regressions include Region*Year and Bank*Year ﬁxed eﬀects.
All regressions include the corresponding set of controls reported in tables 2-7.
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